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Abstract
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National
Resident Matching Program, which annually ﬁlls approximately 20,000
jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching
markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments
show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of
stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are
surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence” result explains this;
that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions
is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process.

The entry level labor market for new physicians in the United States is organized via a centralized clearinghouse called the National Resident Matching
Program (nrmp). Each year, approximately 20,000 jobs are ﬁlled in a process
in which graduating physicians and other applicants interview at residency programs throughout the country, and then compose and submit Rank Order Lists
(rols) to the nrmp, each indicating an applicant’s preference ordering among
the positions for which she has interviewed. Similarly, the residency programs
submit rols of the applicants they have interviewed, along with the number of
positions they wish to ﬁll. The nrmp processes these rols and capacities to
produce a matching of applicants to residency programs.
The clearinghouse used in this market dates from the early 1950’s. It replaced a decentralized process that suﬀered a market failure when residency
programs and applicants started to seek each other out individually through
informal channels, earlier and earlier in advance of employment, rather than
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waiting to participate in the larger market. (By the 1940’s, contracts were typically being signed two years in advance of employment.) Although the matching
algorithm has been adapted over time to meet changes in the structure of medical employment, roughly the same form of clearinghouse market mechanism has
been used since 1951 (see Roth, 1984). The kind of market failure that gave rise
to this clearinghouse has since been seen in many markets (Roth and Xiaolin
Xing, 1994), a number of which have also organized clearinghouses in response.
In the mid 1990’s, in an environment of rapidly changing health care ﬁnancing with many implications for the medical labor market, the market began
to suﬀer a crisis of conﬁdence concerning whether the matching algorithm was
unreasonably favorable to employers at the expense of applicants, and whether
applicants could “game the system” by strategically manipulating the rols
they submitted. The controversy was most clearly expressed in an exchange
in Academic Medicine (Kevin J. Williams 1995a,b, Peranson and Richard R.
Randlett 1995a,b). In reaction to this exchange, groups such as the American
Medical Student Association together with Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen Health
Research Group (1995), and the Medical Student Section of the AMA (1995)
advocated that the matching algorithm be changed and/or that the description
of the match be changed to give applicants more accurate advice about how to
participate.1
Medical school personnel responsible for advising students about the job
market began to report that many students believed the nrmp did not function
in the best interest of students, and that students were discussing the possibility
of diﬀerent kinds of strategic behavior. Given the prior history of market failure
due to lack of conﬁdence in the market in this and other entry level professional
labor markets, these reports deserved and received the most serious attention.
In this atmosphere, in the Fall of 1995 the Board of Directors of the nrmp
commissioned the design of a new algorithm for conducting the annual match,
and a study comparing it to the existing nrmp algorithm. The present paper
reports how the new algorithm was designed, how the two algorithms were
compared, and what was learned about the market in the process. (In May of
1997 the nrmp Board of Directors decided to switch to the new algorithm, and
the ﬁrst match using the new algorithm was successfully completed in March
1998.)
In the course of designing, testing, and evaluating the new clearinghouse
algorithm, some surprising properties of large labor markets emerged. The high
transaction costs involved in interviewing place a practical limit on how many
interviews are conducted, and one consequence of this is that the set of stable
outcomes is very small, and there are very few opportunities for participants to
engage in strategic manipulation of their stated preferences when it comes to
making and accepting oﬀers. (Neither of these would be the case in the absence
1 At around the same time, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice initiated a
wide ranging discovery process concerning these markets. This ultimately gave rise to a fairly
narrowly focused consent decree involving the practices of the Association of Family Practice
Residency Directors (U. S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, (1996)).
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of transaction costs.)
Aside from describing these new facts, and presenting some theoretical computation to explain them, we also describe in this paper the process by which
the new clearinghouse algorithm was designed, evaluated, and compared with
the existing algorithm. At each stage this process involved computational experiments. This process resembles engineering practice rather than theorem
proving or hypothesis testing. But, despite the fact that economists are increasingly called upon to design markets, there is little or no economic literature
devoted to the engineering aspects of economic design, and the practical problems of moving from theory about simple markets to workable institutions for
complex markets. Yet if we fail to develop such an “engineering” literature, we
will fail to proﬁt from design experience in a cumulative way. The present paper
then, in addition to presenting some new results, is intended to take a step in
the direction of an engineering literature as well, by describing how those facts
were learned, and how they impacted on design decisions.2
A rough analogy may be helpful for thinking about how the diﬀerent parts
of this paper hang together. Consider the design of suspension bridges. The
Newtonian physics they embody is beautiful both in mathematics and in steel,
and college students can be taught to derive the curves that describe the shape
of the supporting cables. But no bridge could be built based only on this
elegant theoretical treatment, in which the only force is gravity, and all beams
are perfectly rigid. Real bridges are built of steel, and rest on rock and soil
and water, and so bridge design also concerns metal fatigue, soil mechanics,
and the force of waves and wind. Many design questions concerning these real
world complications cannot be answered analytically, but must be explored using
physical or computational models. Often these involve estimating magnitudes of
phenomena missing from the simple Newtonian model, some of which are small
enough to be of little consequence, while others will cause the bridge to fall down
if not adequately addressed. And so, just as no suspension bridges could be built
without an understanding of the underlying physics, neither could any be built
without understanding many additional features, also physical in nature, but
more varied and complex than addressed by the simple model. These additional
features, and how they are related to and interact with that part of the physics
captured by the simple model, are the concern of the scientiﬁc literature of
engineering. Some of this is less elegant than the Newtonian model, but it is
what makes bridges stand. Just as important, it allows bridges designed on the
same basic Newtonian model to be built longer, stronger, and lighter over time,
as the complexities and how to deal with them become better understood.
For the design of the medical labor market clearinghouse, the underlying
theory is the theory of two-sided matching. Simple models of two-sided matching markets have proven to be elegant and tractable, and very useful in un2 Some beginnings of such a literature can also be found in connection with the design of
electricity markets (Wilson, 1993), and the auction of radio spectrum; see e.g. Ausubel et al
(1997), Cramton (1997), Ledyard et al. (1997), McMillan (1994, 1995), McAfee and McMillan
(1996), Milgrom (1997), Plott (1997), Salant (1997). There is of course already something of
an engineering oriented literature in ﬁnance; for an innovative example see Shiller (1993).
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derstanding the organization and evolution of many markets. But the theory
concentrates on simple models in which no worker needs more than one job, and
there are no married couples or other connections between workers or between
positions. There is a large body of theory relevant to design problems (see e.g.
Roth and Marilda Sotomayor, 1990), but none of the theorems apply directly to
the medical market, although many of the counterexamples do. That is, many
of the existing theorems rest on assumptions not met in the complex medical
market, and many of the medical market’s complexities are known to open the
door to the possibility of serious design problems. But the counterexamples
do not give any guidance to the magnitude of these problems, and for this we
will have to rely on computational exploration, both of the data from the medical market itself, and of simpler models which will help explain what is going
on in the complex market. In both cases, the computational explorations will
be guided by the theory, which will make possible computational experiments
that would be impossible to conduct by brute force on such large markets. It
seems likely that as game theory moves from simple conceptual problems to
complex design problems, we will need to make more general use of this interaction among theory, computational investigation of market data, and theoretical
computation, and that this in turn will produce new problems and directions
for traditional theory.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I gives an overview of the medical market and the design problem, and presents some necessary background by
discussing stable matchings and why they are important, how complex markets
diﬀer from simple markets with respect to stable matchings, and how the algorithm used by the nrmp prior to this study is structured. Section II presents
statistics describing the market and previous match results. These demonstrate
that three of the four match variations that make the nrmp a complex market
are present in substantial numbers. Section III describes how the new algorithm
was designed, including the role of computational experiments. Section IV compares the performance of the two algorithms on the data from recent matches,
and Section V looks at the possibilities for strategic behavior when each of the
two algorithms is employed. In studying the possibilities for strategic behavior,
we will ﬁrst treat the rol data as if they were the true preferences of the agents,
and then (in Section VI) show why this is justiﬁed, and also explain why the
set of stable matchings turns out to be so small. Section VII presents some
thoughts on the interplay among theory, computational experiments, and theoretical computation in the design of market mechanisms. The theory of simple
markets framed the questions that needed to be answered in the course of this
design, and suggested how to construct and evaluate computational experiments
on the complex system to answer these questions. The magnitudes determined
by the computational experiments were then explained with theoretical computations on simple markets, providing results which, with the aid of theory, could
be unambiguously interpreted. This interplay was what gave the present design
eﬀort its “engineering” ﬂavor, and we suspect that this will generalize to other
design eﬀorts. Section VIII concludes.
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Background to the Present Study

The considerable body of theory that has been developed for two-sided matching markets, together with multiple opportunities to observe empirically both
the successful and unsuccessful clearinghouse organization of other entry level
labor markets, provided a general road map for both the design and evaluation
of a new clearinghouse algorithm. Speciﬁcally, there was strong empirical evidence that successful clearinghouses are generally those that produce matchings
that are stable in the sense that they do not create “blocking pairs” of agents,
not matched to one another, who would mutually prefer to be matched to one
another than to accept the matching produced by the clearinghouse. And the
theory clearly shows that, in suﬃciently simple markets (simple in a way that
will shortly be made precise), systematic welfare comparisons can be made between diﬀerent stable matchings, with some being relatively favorable to ﬁrms
and unfavorable to workers, and some the reverse. In addition, for suﬃciently
simple markets the theory allows strong conclusions to be drawn about the
opportunity and scope for strategic behavior. (For an overview of the theory,
relevant parts of which will be reviewed below, see Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
The goal of the design was to construct an algorithm that would produce
stable matchings as favorable as possible to applicants, while meeting the speciﬁc constraints of the medical market. The comparisons between the new and
existing algorithms were to focus both on how many applicants and residency
programs could be expected to receive more or less preferred matches under
the two algorithms, and on how the diﬀerent algorithms might inﬂuence the
opportunity or need for strategic behavior by applicants and programs. Closely
related issues were what advice could be given to participants in the match
when it is conducted with one or the other of the algorithms, and what kinds
of changes in the behavior of match participants might be anticipated if the
matching algorithm were changed.
These questions were at the heart of the controversy that spilled into the
medical journals in 1995. Much of that discussion referred to results in the theoretical literature concerning simple two-sided matching markets. But although
the nrmp originated as a simple market, it has become more complex particularly since the early 1980’s, as it has developed complementaries and linkages
between positions and between applicants. These arise through four kinds of
“match variations,” introduced to accommodate the changing structure of the
medical labor market, namely:
(i) couples in the applicant pool who seek two positions close to one another;
(ii) applicants who seek second year positions in the match and, if they are
successful, have supplemental rank order lists which must be consulted to match
them to prerequisite ﬁrst year positions;
(iii) residency programs with positions that revert to other programs if they
remain unﬁlled;3 and
3 Typically these reversions arise when e.g. the director of a second year postgraduate
residency program arranges with the director of a prerequisite ﬁrst year program that his
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(iv) programs that wish to ﬁll an even number of positions if they cannot
ﬁll all their positions.
These linkages can be shown to allow situations in which many of the conclusions reached about simpler markets no longer apply.
It was therefore necessary, both in designing the new algorithm and in making comparisons to the existing algorithm, to ﬁrst conduct computational experiments to determine the extent to which the predictions of the theory of simple
matching markets applied to the nrmp. These computational experiments, as
well as those employed to compare the two algorithms, were conducted on the
Rank Order Lists submitted by all applicants and residency programs in the
four most recent matches (1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996) and in the 1987 match.
The recent matches were selected to have contemporary patterns of preferences
among applicants and residency programs, and 1987 was selected for a comparison over a longer period, and speciﬁcally because it had the lowest rate of
unmatched US seniors in the available data set (6.0 percent, as opposed to the
historically high rate of 7.5 percent for 1996).
A number of specialty matches are also run under the auspices of the nrmp,
and these are largely free of the match variations which add complexity to the
general resident match. The existing theory of simple matching markets therefore provides accurate predictions about the nature and direction of changes to
be anticipated in these matches if the existing nrmp algorithm were replaced
by the new algorithm. However the theory oﬀers little guide to the magnitude
of the changes to be expected, and for this purpose computational experiments
on the data of past matches were also needed. These were conducted for the
Thoracic Surgery match, for the ﬁve years 1991-1994 and 1996.
The design of the new algorithm and the comparisons of the two algorithms
will be discussed in detail in the body of the paper. But the general conclusions
can be summarized by noting that, both for the nrmp and the specialty matches,
the eﬀects of changing from the existing algorithm to the newly designed algorithm are in the directions predicted by the theory for simple markets, but
the size of these changes is small, and the opportunities for proﬁtable strategic
behavior are comparably small for both applicants and programs under either
algorithm.
In the course of explaining why the diﬀerences are so small, we will present
a new kind of “core convergence” result, which shows that the size of the set of
stable matchings becomes small as the size of the market increases, even when
preferences are uncorrelated, provided that the number of positions for which
an applicant can interview remains small (and not otherwise).
residents will spend their ﬁrst year in that prerequisite program. However if the second year
program then fails to match with as many residents as were anticipated, this leaves vacancies
in the ﬁrst year program that can be ﬁlled by other applicants.
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Stable Matchings in Simple and Complex Matching
Markets

Centralized matching mechanisms often arise to solve market failures due to
unraveling of appointment dates. Perhaps the most important and least controversial empirical ﬁnding about centralized matching algorithms is that they are
most often successful if the matchings they produce are stable (Roth ’84, 90, 91,
Roth and Xing ’94, John Kagel and Roth ’99). In a simple matching market, a
matching between applicants and residency programs is stable if there is no applicant or program matched to an unacceptable (unlisted) partner, and if there
are no applicant-program pairs such that the applicant prefers the program to
his/her current match, and the program also prefers the applicant to one of its
current matches (or vacant position).4
So this study, and the controversy which preceded it, focused on choices
among algorithms which produce stable matchings. The reason for the controversy is that there can be systematic diﬀerences among stable matchings.
Appendix C gives formal deﬁnitions of stability in simple and complex matching markets, but the basic ideas can be conveyed by considering the “deferred
acceptance algorithm” ﬁrst formally studied by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley
(1962).5 There are two basic versions of this algorithm, in each of which one
side of the market (ﬁrms or workers) makes oﬀers, which the other side can
reject or hold to see if any better oﬀers are forthcoming.
In the worker proposing version of the algorithm, each worker begins by
applying for the position at the top of her preference list. Each ﬁrm rejects any
unacceptable candidates, and if it has q positions it temporarily holds the (up
to) q most preferred applications it has so far received, and rejects the rest. A
candidate who is rejected at any step of the algorithm next applies to her next
highest ranked position (if any remain) among those not yet applied to. The
algorithm stops at any step in which no new applications are made, at which
point each worker is matched to the ﬁrm (if any) holding her application.
In a simple market the resulting matching must be stable (i.e. there are no
ﬁrm-worker blocking pairs) since, if a worker w prefers ﬁrm f to her ﬁnal match,
she must have applied to ﬁrm f and been rejected, and hence ﬁrm f does not
4 Among the programs and applicants who have interviewed one another, programs do not
list applicants with whom they are unwilling to match, and applicants do not list programs
with whom they are unwilling to match. (Unmatched programs and applicants can be matched
in the post-match secondary market called the “scramble,” which takes place primarily in
the twenty four hour period before the oﬃcial public announcements of the match results.)
Programs and applicants generally also do not list applicants or programs with whom they
have not had interviews (and this is of course an equilibrium, since the clearinghouse produces
a stable matching, at which you cannot be matched to someone who has not listed you, so
there is no incentive to list him.) There is also a charge to applicants who list more than 15
residency programs, which may dissuade some applicants from listing some programs.
5 Although Gale and Shapley discussed the algorithm in an abstract setting, it appears
that, in various forms, equivalent algorithms have been developed in applied contexts both
before and since, with the initial nrmp algorithm, dating from 1951, being the ﬁrst we know
of (Roth, 1984).
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prefer her to any of the workers whose applications it held when the algorithm
stopped. Furthermore, Gale and Shapley showed that, when preferences are
strict, the particular stable matching produced by the worker-proposing version
of the algorithm gives each worker her most preferred position among those she
can get at any stable matching. Even more striking, the ﬁrm-proposing version
of the algorithm gives every ﬁrm which ﬁlls q positions its q most preferred
workers among those it can be matched to at any stable matching (Roth 1985,
Roth and Sotomayor 1989). Much of the controversy about the organization of
the nrmp focused on this diﬀerence between these two versions of the deferred
acceptance algorithm.
But a deferred acceptance algorithm may fail to produce a stable matching
in a market with some of the complexities of the nrmp, such as the presence of
couples who submit rank order lists of pairs of positions. The key to the stability
of the outcome in simple markets is that (in the worker-proposing version of the
algorithm) no ﬁrm ever regrets having rejected a worker’s application, since it
only does so when it has an application it prefers, and it will be matched to this
preferred application unless it receives applications it prefers even more. But,
in a market containing couples, suppose that a ﬁrm f1 receives an application
from a worker w1 , and rejects an application from a less preferred worker w
in order to hold w1 ’s application. Suppose further that w1 is married to w2 ,
whose application is being held by ﬁrm f2 , because the pair (f1 , f2 ) is high on
the preference list submitted by the couple c = (w1 , w2 ). Finally, suppose that
ﬁrm f2 now receives an application it prefers, and rejects the application of w2 .
In order for the couple c to now apply to its next-choice pair of ﬁrms (f3 , f4 ),
w1 must now be withdrawn from ﬁrm f1 . So ﬁrm f1 now regrets having rejected
worker w, and there may be a potential instability involving f1 and w (and
if w is part of a couple this instability may involve another ﬁrm as well; see
Appendix C).
The diﬀerences between simple and complex markets involve more than the
failure of the deferred acceptance algorithm to produce stable matchings, but
extend to the non-emptiness and structure of the set of stable matchings itself.
Some of the important diﬀerences are summarized below, by noting theorems
about simple matching markets which do not hold when the market contains
couples or other linkages which create complementarities between positions or
applicants. (See Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, for a comprehensive treatment and
more detailed references to the literature.)
(i) In simple matching markets, ﬁrm and worker optimal stable matchings
exist for all possible rols, and are produced by the ﬁrm and worker proposing
variants of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962, Roth,
1985).
(i’) In markets with complementarities, no stable matching may exist, and
even when stable matchings exist there may be no optimal stable matchings
for either side of the market (Roth, 1984, Brian Aldershof and Olivia Carducci,
1996).
(ii) In simple markets, the same applicants are matched and the same positions are ﬁlled at every stable matching. (That is, any applicant who is un-
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matched at one stable matching is unmatched at every stable matching, and
the positions which are unﬁlled are the same at every stable matching.) Furthermore, a ﬁrm which ﬁlls only some of its positions at a stable matching ﬁlls
them with the same workers at every stable matching (Roth, 1986).
(ii’) In markets with complementarities, diﬀerent stable matchings may have
diﬀerent applicants matched and diﬀerent positions ﬁlled (Aldershof and Carducci, 1996).
(iii) In simple markets, when the applicant proposing algorithm is used (but
not when the program proposing algorithm is used) it is a dominant strategy for
applicants to submit rols corresponding to their true preferences. No parallel
assertion can be made about residency programs which have more than one
position (Roth 1982, 1985).
(iii’) In markets with complementarities, no algorithm exists that chooses a
stable matching whenever one exists and makes it a dominant strategy for all
agents to state their true preferences (Roth, 1985, Aljosa Feldin, in preparation).
So a major focus of this study was to assess the extent to which these theoretical possibilities play a role in the actual nrmp matches. In the course of this
report it will become clear that, while it has always been possible to ﬁnd stable
matchings in the previous years’ nrmp matches (a stable matching has been
found in every match at least since the mid 1970’s), it appears that no stable
matching is precisely program-optimal or applicant-optimal in any of the years
we have examined. However we will see that applicant-proposing and programproposing algorithms continue to perform approximately as in the case of simple
markets.

B.

The Pre-existing NRMP Algorithm:

The pre-existing nrmp algorithm (the one in use in 1995 when this study began,
and used through the 1997 matches) is the result of incremental modiﬁcations
over a period of years. It is primarily, but not entirely, a program-proposing
algorithm, and deals with match variations through a three-phase process. The
ﬁrst phase produces an initial match by ignoring most match variations, using
the program-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, modiﬁed to let couples
hold on to many oﬀers until a late stage in the algorithm. The match produced
in this way will in general not be stable (because of the way it handles couples,
and because the other match variations are ignored), so the second phase of the
program identiﬁes potential instabilities. The third phase of the program uses
an algorithm to ﬁx these instabilities one by one and produce a stable match.
The processing in this third phase does not always have residency programs
proposing. Instead, couples propose in part of the algorithm designed to ﬁx
instabilities due to couples, and applicants also propose in part of the algorithm
which ﬁxes instabilities related to supplemental (ﬁrst year) matches. Thus the
1995 nrmp algorithm is a hybrid; program-proposing in its ﬁrst phase (which
performs the bulk of the matching), and applicant-proposing in some parts of
its third phase.
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The nrmp specialty matches like Thoracic surgery are run using an algorithm that is technically a little diﬀerent than the original nrmp algorithm (it
does not handle some of the nrmp match variations such as the use of supplemental lists to form multi-year matches, and it is organized in a single phase).
But when no match variations are present, the specialty match algorithm and
the 1995 nrmp algorithm are functionally equivalent to the program-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm in that they all produce the program-optimal
stable matching.

II.

The NRMP in the Years 1987 and 1993–6

Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the nrmp match in the ﬁve years
we consider. Notice that in each year, a substantial number of the more than
twenty thousand applicants who participate do so in ways which utilize the
match variations which the nrmp allows–about 4 percent participate as couples, and 8-12 percent submit supplemental Rank Order Lists. In addition, in
the 1990’s about 7 percent of the three to four thousand programs which participate in each year have positions which could revert to other programs if they
remain unﬁlled (accounting for almost 6 percent of the total quota of positions).
So the match variations are a substantial part of the match. Before investigating how these match variations change the properties of stable matches and of
strategic behavior, the ﬁrst task is the design of an applicant proposing algorithm to produce stable matches that meet the match variation requirements of
thousands of participants.

A.

Specialty Matches: Thoracic Surgery in the Years 1991–
94 and 1996

In contrast, the Thoracic surgery match is a simple match, with no match
variations. Its basic descriptive statistics and match results are given in Table
1B.

III.

Design of the Applicant-Proposing Algorithm

The process by which the applicant-proposing algorithm was designed is roughly
as follows. First, a conceptual design was formulated and circulated for comment
(Roth, 1996a). This was based on an algorithm for simple markets, modiﬁed
to deal with the complexities of the nrmp. In order for this to be coded into
a working algorithm, a number of choices had to be made concerning the sequence in which proposals would be made. The sequencing of proposals can be
shown to have no eﬀect on the outcome of simple matches, but could potentially eﬀect the outcome when the nrmp match variations are present. Thus,
like the overall architecture of the algorithm, the sequencing of proposals is a design question about which the existing theory gives some general guidance that
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Original Match Results for (A) the NRMP and
(B) Thoracic Surgery

Category
Applicants (Active, rolreturned)
Primary rols
Applicants with supplemental rols
Results
Primary matches
Supplemental matches
Couples
Applicants who are coupled
Coupled applicants who matched

A. nrmp
1987

1993

1994

1995

1996

20,071
1,572

20,916
2,515

22,353
2,312

22,937
2,098

24,749
2,436

16,117
577

17,209
1,294

17,725
1,152

18,170
990

18,316
725

694
646

854
794

892
817

998
899

1,008
912

3,225
3,170

3,677
3,622

3,715
3,662

3,800
3,745

3,830
3,758

69
225
4

247
1,329
2

276
1,467
6

285
1,291
7

282
1,272
8

19,973

22,737

22,801

22,806

22,578

Programs
Active programs
Active programs with rol returned
Potential reversions of unﬁlled positions
Programs specifying reversion
Positions to be reverted if unﬁlled
Programs requesting even/odd matching
Quotas: a
Total quota before match
Changes during match processing
Quota decreases
Programs
Positions
Quota decreases
Programs
Positions
Total quota after match (ﬁnal quota)

22
45

120
357

143
357

124
327

130
336

23
46
19,972

127
338
22,756

142
338
22,820

128
303
22,830

138
326
22,588

Results
Positions ﬁlled
Positions unﬁlled
Program ﬁlled

16,694
3,278
2,100

18,503
4,253
2,309

18,877
3,943
2,440

19,160
3,670
2,599

19,041
3,547
2,589

B. Thoracic Surgery
1991
1992
127
183
67
89
62
86
93
132
79
123

1993
200
91
90
141
136

1994
197
93
93
146
140

1996
176
92
92
143
132

Category
Applicant rols
Active programs
Program rols
Total quota
Positions ﬁlled
a Quotas

include positions in active programs with no rol returned. Changes during the
match are caused primarily by reversions. In some cases, 1 position is reverted simultaneously
to 2 programs, causing a net increase in the number of positions oﬀered. In addition, a few
positions may be dropped from the match during processing to accommodate requests for
even/odd matching.
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falls short of a complete engineering speciﬁcation. Consequently, we performed
computational experiments before making sequencing choices. In what follows,
we ﬁrst present the conceptual design (from Roth 1996a), and then discuss the
sequencing experiments and implementation decisions.

A.

The Conceptual Design

The algorithm described here is based on the instability-chaining algorithm in
Roth and John H. Vande Vate (1990) (which ﬁnds stable matchings by resolving
applicant-program instabilities one at a time) and on the general design of phase
3 of the pre-existing nrmp algorithm.
The object of the algorithm is to produce a stable matching, by assembling a
set A(k) of residency programs and applicants and a tentative matching M (k)
with the property that there are no instabilities within the set A(k), and no
applicant or program in A(k) is matched to anyone outside of A(k). When the
set A(k) has grown to include all applicants and programs, the resulting match
is stable, and the algorithm stops.
In the applicant-proposing algorithm, the initial set, A(0), consists of all
positions oﬀered in the match, and the initial tentative matching has all positions
vacant. The algorithm begins by selecting an applicant S(1) from the set of
applicants in the match and adding S(1) to A(0) to make the new set A(1).
At any step k of the algorithm, at which a new applicant S(k) has just been
added to form the set A(k), the new tentative matching M (k) is formed as
follows. First, applicant S(k)[= S(k, 1)] proposes down his Rank Order List (of
programs which also rank S(k)), from the top, until the ﬁrst program is reached
which either has a vacant position or which prefers S(k) to its least preferred
current tentative match. In the latter case, this least preferred applicant, S(k, 2)
is now rejected by the program in question, and this applicant now proposes
down her rol in a similar way, etc. Each applicant S(k, n) displaced in this
way similarly proposes down his/her rol.
At some point in this process, an applicant S(k, n) may be displaced who
is a member of a couple, or who is displaced from a primary (second year)
position for which she also holds a supplemental (ﬁrst year) position. In either
case, a second position now potentially becomes vacant, as the spouse of S(k, n)
is withdrawn from his tentative match, or as S(k, n) is withdrawn from her
supplemental match. In either case, the program whose position is left vacant,
P (k, n), is added to a “program stack” to be held for later processing. If S(k, n)
is a couple, then both couple members (S(k, n, a) and S(k, n, b)) now propose
down their joint rol of pairs of programs, and they each may displace another
applicant. Also, if any S(k, n) has a supplemental rol associated with her new
tentative match, she proposes down it as well, which may also result in the
displacement of another applicant. So both couples and supplemental matches
may simultaneously displace more than one applicant. One displaced applicant
is processed immediately and any others are added to an “applicant stack” for
later processing.
Applicants propose down their rol’s in this way until the applicant stack
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is empty. (Applicants continue throughout to be able to propose to programs
which may be on the program stack.) A residency program is then selected from
the program stack, and all of the applicants in A(k) with whom it might form
instabilities—i.e., all of the applicants in A(k) who are preferred by the program
to its least preferred current tentative match and who prefer this program to
their current match—are added to the applicant stack, which is processed as
before, with applicants proposing down their rol, from the top.
When both the applicant and program stacks are empty, the tentative matching thus produced is M (k): no instabilities for M (k) are contained in the set
A(k), and no applicant or program in A(k) is matched by M (k) to anyone outside of A(k). The algorithm is now ready to pick a new applicant S(k + 1), and
start the process again, for the set A(k + 1).
When all applicants have been included in the set A(k), even-odd requests
and program reversions are adjusted, which causes additions to the applicant
and program stacks, which are handled as above. When these stacks are empty,
the algorithm stops, and the last tentative match becomes ﬁnal.
In a match with no match variations, the applicant and position stacks would
always become empty, and the ﬁnal match would be the applicant optimal
stable matching. When the match variations are present, there is a possibility
that at some stages of the algorithm the position stacks would never become
empty–i.e. a cycle would occur, in which the same positions reappeared on
the stack. So “loop detectors” need to be added to each stage k. Every loop
must involve a position becoming unmatched and made vacant either because a
couple or a supplemental assignment has been withdrawn from the position, or a
position has been withdrawn from an applicant (e.g. in satisfying an even/odd
constraint). So a loop detector can work by keeping a log of when positions
become unmatched in these ways–i.e., recording which applicant is unmatched
from which position, during the processing of some step A(k). If the same pairs
appear multiple times, a loop is in progress. How to proceed at this point may
depend on the nature of the loop. (It is observed in Roth and Vande Vate (1990)
that certain kinds of inessential loops can be rendered harmless by randomizing
the order in which applicants and positions are processed from the stacks. Loops
due to the non-existence of a stable matching would be more serious, but the
prior experience of the nrmp suggests that these may be rare.)
Thus, the existing theory suggests the general architecture for an applicant
proposing algorithm that can deal with instabilities one at a time as they are
detected, and provides guidance on how the algorithm may possibly fail to ﬁnd
a stable matching. But to determine how often it might fail to produce a stable
matching we need some computational experiments. The experiments reported
next, which will help determine the details of the algorithm design, will also
show that failures are rare: we will not observe even a single failure when we
explore diﬀerent versions of the algorithm on previous years’ rol data.
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Sequencing Questions and Implementation Decisions

In a simple match, without the nrmp match variations, the applicant-proposing
algorithm just described always produces the applicant-optimal stable match
and the program-proposing algorithm always produces the program-optimal stable match, regardless of the order in which proposals are processed within the
algorithm. One consequence of the fact that these optimal stable matches do
not exist in general when the match variations are present is that the order in
which applicants and programs are processed may have an eﬀect on the match
produced. Thus the sequence in which applicants and programs are processed
at various points in the algorithm needs to be considered as part of the design
of the applicant-proposing algorithm.
Two issues were considered in conducting and evaluating experiments related
to the sequencing of operations in the algorithms.
(i) Do sequencing diﬀerences cause substantial or predictable changes in the
match result (e.g. do applicants or programs selected ﬁrst do better or worse
than their counterparts selected later)?6
(ii) Does the sequence of processing aﬀect the likelihood that an algorithm
will produce a stable matching? (In connection with this latter point, recall
that instability-chain algorithms can cycle –even when stable matchings exist
and certainly when they do not. So one objective was to consider how sequencing
decisions might inﬂuence the frequency of “loops” occurring in the algorithm.)
Experiments to test the eﬀect of sequencing were conducted using data from
three nrmp matches: 1993, 1994, and 1995.
1. Sequencing Experiments on the Pre-existing nrmp Algorithm
We investigated the eﬀect of diﬀerent sequencing of operations in variants of
the pre-existing nrmp algorithm, in part to establish a baseline against which to
compare the algorithm to be designed. In the pre-existing algorithm, programs
are processed in ascending sequence by 6 digit program code number. To test
the sensitivity of the results to this sequencing, computational experiments were
run on the rol data in which this sequencing was reversed, i.e. programs were
processed in descending order by program code number. As expected, the results
showed diﬀerences, but the diﬀerences were small: the largest diﬀerence was
in 1994 when only 4 out of 3,662 programs which submitted rol’s received a
diﬀerent match under the alternative ordering, as did 4 out of 22,353 applicants.
Not only are these diﬀerences very small, they do not appear to be systematic.7
6 Even in a simple matching market, the order in which proposals are made can matter in
versions of the Roth and Vande Vate (1990) instability chaining algorithm in which members
of both sides of the market may be chosen to make the next proposal (in contrast to versions in
which all proposals are made by one side of the market). Blum and Rothblum (forthcoming)
show that, in such a version of the algorithm, late proposers have an advantage over early
proposers
7 We use the term ”very small” informally, but not merely to express an opinion of changes
which aﬀect on the order of .01 percent of applicants. These changes are also at least an order
of magnitude smaller than the main eﬀects we will ﬁnd due to changes between program
proposing and applicant proposing algorithms. And since the eﬀects appear unsystematic,
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(A fuller account of the results of these experiments appears in Appendix A.)
The pre-existing nrmp algorithm was also investigated for its sensitivity to
the sequence in which reversions are processed. Rather than simply changing
the order in which reversions occurred, the experiments involved setting the program quotas input to the match processing to be the ﬁnal, post match quotas
obtained from the original results produced by the pre-existing nrmp algorithm.
All further reversion processing was then eliminated. These experiments then
provided an indication of the diﬀerences caused, not only by changing the order
of reversions, but also by altering when reversions enter into the match processing (i.e. all required reversions were assumed to take place simultaneously, at
the beginning of match processing). No more than 2 programs or applicants
were observed to be aﬀected by such changes in any of the three years 1993-5
(see Appendix A).
Finally, it should be noted that no loops were detected in any of these experiments on the pre-existing nrmp algorithm. Consequently, despite the presence
of match variations, sequencing does not appear to play a signiﬁcant role in the
operation of the pre-existing nrmp algorithm.
2. Sequencing Experiments on the Applicant-Proposing Algorithm
Computational experiments were conducted to measure the impact of
(i) The sequence in which applicants are admitted to the algorithm for processing;
(ii) The sequence in which couples are processed relative to other applicants;
and
(iii) The sequence in which applicants ranked by a program are processed
when attempting to ﬁll a program that has been selected from the program
stack.
To understand the results of the computational experiments (which are tabulated in detail in Appendix A) it is useful to compare the outcomes from each
experiment to those from a ﬁxed baseline. We chose as a baseline an applicant
proposing algorithm in which applicants were processed in ascending order by
their applicant codes, regardless of whether they were single or members of couples. (In all cases, when a member of a couple was processed, so was the other
member. When applicants were processed in ascending code order a couple was
selected for processing based on the code number of the spouse with the lower
applicant code.) When a program was selected from the program stack, applicants were processed in ascending sequence by program rank number. All of
these experiments were carried out on the rol data from the nrmp matches in
1993, 1994, and 1995.
The experiments were conducted in a partial factorial design. The handling
of couples had 3 treatments (couples intermixed with singles, couples ﬁrst, couples last), the order of introducing applicants into the match had 2 treatments
(ascending order by applicant code, or descending order), and the order of processing applicants when a program is pulled from the stack had 2 treatments
they do not appear to have any welfare implications on average.
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(ascending order by program rank, or descending order). The results are that
none of these sequencing decisions had a large or a systematic eﬀect on the
matching produced. In two thirds of the cases the match was the same as the
baseline case. (In the majority of the remaining cases only 2 applicants received
diﬀerent matches, and the maximum number of applicants aﬀected was 12 out
of 22,937, which occurred when a couple received a worse match and initiated a
chain of displacements. This happened in two of the eighteen cases and involved
the same 12 applicants in both cases).
However there was an eﬀect of sequencing on the internal processing of the
algorithm. The number of loops encountered was fewest when couples were introduced to the match after single applicants. This is not too surprising in view
of the fact that no loops would occur in the absence of match variations. The
results indicate that loops are least likely to occur when the couples are introduced into the larger market with some tentative matches already assembled, as
opposed to when couples enter ﬁrst, so that the initial tentative matches involve
only couples. Introducing couples last reduces the numbers of loops (and hence
the potential that in some future match it would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd a stable
matching) without changing the prospects of couples or single applicants in the
match.
Finally, experiments related to the sequence in which reversions are processed were performed on an applicant proposing algorithm, similar to those
performed on the pre-existing nrmp algorithm. Again, no substantial changes
were induced by changing the order in which reversions were handled; no changes
at all resulted in the 1993 match, and only 2 applicants and programs were affected in the 1994 and 1995 matches (see Appendix A). Thus for both the
pre-existing nrmp algorithm and the applicant proposing algorithm, there is
almost no diﬀerence between the results obtained with reversion processing and
the results obtained by setting the quotas to the ﬁnal quotas after reversions
and eliminating further reversion processing. (This point simpliﬁes the design
of some of the experiments to compare the two algorithms, in connection with
strategic behavior by residency programs, to be discussed later in this report.)
Based on the sequencing experiments described above, it was decided to
sequence all proposals by couples after proposals by single applicants, since this
was the order that produced the fewest internal loops.8
8 The full details of the sequencing decisions are:
1. All single applicants are admitted to the algorithm for processing before any couples are
admitted.
2. Single applicants are admitted for processing in ascending sequence by applicant code.
3. Couples are admitted for processing in ascending sequence by the lower of the two
applicant codes of the couple.
4. When a program is selected from the program stack for processing, the applicants ranked
by the program are processed in ascending order by program rank number.
5. The processing of programs requesting even numbers of matches and/or reversions of
unﬁlled positions is deferred until all applicants have been admitted for processing.
6. Programs requesting even numbers of matches are processed in ascending sequence by
program code. An applicant deleted from a program in order to leave an even number of
matches in the program is placed on the applicant stack for processing.
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Note that we did not at any point choose to randomize the processing order
(randomization was shown in Roth and Vande Vate 1990 to allow the algorithm
to escape from certain kinds of loops). The reason is that loops do not appear
to be a problem with the processing sequences selected, and it was felt that a
desirable feature of the match is that it should be precisely reproducible from
the rol data.

IV.
A.

Diﬀerences in the Matches Produced by the
Two Algorithms
The NRMP

The pre-existing nrmp algorithm and the newly designed applicant proposing
algorithm were compared by comparing the matches that they produce for the
rol’s submitted in 1987 and 1993-1996. Table 2 gives the results of these comparisons. The ﬁrst half of the table concentrates on the comparisons from the
point of view of applicants, the second half from the point of view of programs.
Only about 0.1 percent of applicants are aﬀected by the change in algorithms,
and of these most prefer the match they receive under the applicant proposing
algorithm. Note that in two of the ﬁve years the number of applicants matched
changed by one (one fewer in 1987, one more in 1996). Recall that in a simple
match a change from one stable matching to another would never change the
number of applicants matched; so here is another case in which the match
variations cause a diﬀerence, but a diﬀerence which turns out to be very small
and unsystematic.
Equally few programs are aﬀected by the change of algorithms–and these
constitute about 0.5 percent of all programs. Most but not all of the programs
prefer the match they receive under the pre-existing nrmp algorithm, but in
1994 and 1996 slightly more programs would even have preferred the applicant
proposing algorithm to the pre-existing nrmp algorithm. Most programs that
receive a diﬀerent match have only one applicant diﬀerent between the matches
produced by the two algorithms. The majority of diﬀerences have to do with
ﬁlling a position with a diﬀerent applicant; only a small number of positions
7. Programs requesting reversions of unﬁlled positions are processed in ascending sequence
by the program code of the program ”donating” the unﬁlled position(s). A program that
“receives” a reverted position is placed on the program stack for processing.
8. After all reversions have been processed, the requests for reversions are reprocessed, in
case any new reversions of unﬁlled positions are required as a result of changes made in the
processing of reversions that have been processed since the last time this reversion request
was considered.
9. When no further processing is required to satisfy all reversions, requests for even numbers
of matches are reprocessed as in point 6 above, and if any changes are made, requests for
reversions are reprocessed as in points 7 and 8 above. This iterative processing continues until
no further changes are made by even processing or reversion processing. [The possible need
for a reverted position to be “unreverted” is checked as part of the check for stability, by using
original quotas for programs which have lost positions through reversions.]
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move from being ﬁlled to unﬁlled or vice versa. Again, this is a consequence of
the match variations; as already noted in the case of applicants, it turns out to
be both very rare and unsystematic.
It may be helpful at this point to consider an example of precisely how the
match variations can cause a deviation from the predictions of the theory for
simple markets; for example how it can be that a few applicants do worse with
the applicant proposing algorithm than with the program proposing algorithm.
For example, if switching to the applicant proposing algorithm causes applicant
A to improve his match from his 2nd to 1st choice, it may be that the 1st choice
now requires a supplemental match that was not required before. If this new
supplemental match displaces a previously matched but less preferred applicant
in a program, that displaced applicant is forced to go farther down his/her list
(i.e. does worse). Furthermore, matching that applicant may displace another
applicant, who may displace another, and so on, causing a chain of applicants
who do worse (even though, as expected of the applicant-proposing algorithm,
this chain of events began with an applicant who did better than he would have
had the program-proposing algorithm been used).
It is worth noting that when we refer to “only 0.1 percent” of applicants, we
are talking about a change whose small size we will explain in what follows. But
this does not necessarily imply that the associated change in welfare is small.
Indeed, in the debate that led to this study, and after our report was circulated
to the interested parties, a great deal of discussion stemmed from the view that
the diﬀerence in welfare was likely to be large for the aﬀected applicants, and
likely to be small for the aﬀected programs. This contributed to the decision
to adopt the applicant proposing algorithm, a decision strongly lobbied for by
the student organizations, and eventually unanimously adopted by the nrmp
Board.9

B.

Thoracic Surgery

Because there are no match variations in the Thoracic surgery matches for
the years we consider, they are simple matches, and are well described by the
existing theory. Consequently we know that the applicants will all do as well
as possible at the stable match produced by the applicant proposing algorithm,
and the programs will all do as poorly as possible at that stable matching. What
the theory does not tell us is how large this eﬀect will be; for that we need to
look at the data. As discussed in the introduction, the eﬀect turns out to be
9 The argument about the size, and relative size, of the welfare eﬀects for applicants and
programs can be paraphrased in part roughly as follows. Both programs and applicants
have some uncertainty in their rankings. There may not be that much diﬀerence between a
program’s seventh and seventeenth ranked candidates. Similarly, applicants may not be able
to clearly judge whether they will get a better educational experience at their ﬁrst or second
choice programs. But applicants can clearly judge other factors in their preferences, such as
whether they would prefer to live in Seattle or Miami, where these programs may be located.
Therefore, a change of algorithms may have a big eﬀect on the aﬀected applicants, and only
a small one on the aﬀected programs.
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Table 2: Comparison of Results Between Original NRMP Algorithm and Applicant
Proposing Algorithm
Result
Applicants:
Number of Applicants
Applicant Proposing Result Preferred
Current NRMP Result Preferred
U.S. Applicants Aﬀected
Independent Applicants Aﬀected
Diﬀerence in Result by Rank Number
1 rank
2 ranks
3 ranks
More than 3 ranks
New Matched
New Unmatched
Programs:
Number of Programs Aﬀected
Applicant Proposing Result Preferred
Current nrmp Result Preferred
Diﬀerence in Result by Rank Number
5 or fewer ranks
6 to 10 ranks
11 to 15 ranks
More than 15 ranks
Programs with New Position(s)
Filled
Programs with New Unﬁlled Position(s)

1987

1993

1994

1995

1996

20
12

16
16

20
11

14
14

21
12

8

0

9

0

9

17
3

9
7

17
3

12
2

18
3

12
3
2
2
(max 9)

11
1
3
1
(max 4)

13
4
2
1
(max 5)

8
2
2
2
(max 6)

8
6
2
3
(max 6)

0
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

20
8

15
0

23
12

15
1

19
10

12

15

11

14

9

5
5
0
9
(max 178)

3
3
5
4
(max 36)

9
3
1
6
(max 31)

6
5
3
0

3
3
1
11
(max 191)

0

0

2

1

1

1

0

2

0

0
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minimal: in the ﬁve years we studied, only four applicants and four programs
would have been aﬀected by a change in algorithms; in three of the ﬁve years,
the applicant proposing algorithm would have produced the same match as the
program proposing algorithm, indicating that this was the only stable matching
in those years. (August Colenbrander, 1996, reports similarly small diﬀerences
in the specialty matches he maintains.)
Table 3: Diﬀerence in Result when Algorithm Changed from Preexisting Specialty
Match to Applicant-Proposing
Year Diﬀerence
1991 none
1992 2 applicants improve, 2 program do worse
1993 2 applicants improve, 2 programs do worse
1994 none
1996 none

V.

Diﬀerences in Sensitivity to Participant Behavior

The comparisons of match outcomes discussed in the previous section are all
based on Rank Order Lists which were submitted for matches made by the
pre-existing nrmp and specialty match algorithms. While the changes observed
when the match was instead produced by the applicant proposing algorithm
were small, a comparison of the algorithms also requires us to consider whether
participants might have reason to submit diﬀerent kinds of rol’s if the new
algorithm were to be substituted for the pre-existing one. For this purpose, we
consider whether participants could have favorably inﬂuenced the match, under
either algorithm, by submitting diﬀerent rol’s. The idea is both to assess
how many participants could do so, and how the number is diﬀerent for the
two algorithms. This will also allow us to determine what kinds of advice can
be given to participants about how to participate in the match, under either
algorithm.
Once again, this is a subject about which the theory of simple matching
markets tells us a great deal, for markets without the match variations found
in the nrmp. To see how well the theory for simple markets approximates the
nrmp matches, and also to assess the size of the eﬀects to expect, again required
computational experiments on the data. A quick review of the theory will help
organize the discussion.

Roth and Peranson

A.

Differences in Sensitivity

21

Strategic Behavior in Simple and Complex Matching
Markets

In a simple matching market, without match variations, it has been shown (Roth
1982) that there do not exist any stable matching algorithms which completely
remove the possibility that some applicant or program can get a better match
by submitting an rol that diﬀers from his/her/its straightforward preferences.
However, we already noted that:
In simple markets, when the applicant proposing algorithm is used,
but not when the program proposing algorithm is used, no applicant
can possibly improve his match by submitting an rol that is different from his true preferences. (No parallel assertion can be made
about residency programs that have more than one position.)
So in simple markets, we would ﬁnd strategic opportunities for applicants
only when the program proposing algorithm is used, and the theory tells us what
these might be. Speciﬁcally, consider the rol of some applicant, and deﬁne a
truncation of that rol to be a shorter rol which is the same as the original
rol for as many programs as it ranks. We can then say the that following:
In simple markets when the program proposing algorithm is used,
every applicant who can do better than to submit his true preferences as his rol can do so by submitting a truncation of his true
preferences. That is, if (holding all other rol’s constant) an applicant would be matched to his kth choice if he submitted his true
preferences, and his j choice (with j < k) if he submitted some other
rol, then he can be matched to his j choice by submitting a truncation of his true preferences at the j choice. Furthermore, no part
of his original rol below the kth choice has any eﬀect on the match.
(Roth and Vande Vate 1991.)
It can also be shown that truncations are the kind of manipulation that can
potentially be identiﬁed with the least information about others’ preferences
(Roth and Rothblum, 1999).
In simple markets, the reason that all successful manipulations can (also) be
accomplished by truncations is that, in a simple market, a deferred acceptance
algorithm never “backtracks:” no information in an agent’s rol is used beyond
the point at which that agent is matched. Although we can’t apply this result
directly to the complex market, we can do computational experiments to assess
how good an approximation is provided by concentrating only on truncations in
the investigation of possible strategic manipulations in the nrmp. Speciﬁcally,
if we ﬁnd that information about agents’ preferences among options below the
point at which they are matched has little eﬀect on the match, then we can be
conﬁdent that investigating truncations will give us a comparably good approximation for the magnitude of possible strategic manipulations in the complex
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nrmp market.10
For simple markets, the theory also tells us which applicants can potentially
proﬁt from manipulation, and how much:
In simple markets, when the program proposing algorithm is used,
the only applicants who can do better than to submit their true
preferences are those who would have received a diﬀerent match
from the applicant proposing algorithm. Furthermore, the best such
applicants can do is to obtain the applicant optimal match, and
they can do this by submitting to the program proposing algorithm
the truncation of their true preferences which stops at the match
they would have gotten from the applicant proposing match. (see
Gabrielle Demange, Gale and Sotomayor, 1987, and Roth and Sotomayor 1990.)
It is important to note that, even in the case of a simple match without
match variations, in general an applicant would not have the information needed
to submit such a truncation (and if he submitted a truncation that was one
program too short he would become unmatched). But this result shows that,
in a simple match, we can identify an upper bound on the number of applicants
who could possibly proﬁt from manipulating their rank order lists, by seeing
how many applicants receive diﬀerent matches at the two algorithms.
We cannot directly apply this upper bound to the nrmp, because it depends for its proof on the existence of optimal stable matchings for each side
of the market, which we know (from the sequencing experiments) do not exist in the nrmp data. But the theory of simple matches allows us to use the
computational results reported in Table 2 as a numerical benchmark against
which to compare the computational estimates we will make of the scope for
possible manipulation. That is, we can compare the estimates we get of how
many applicants can potentially proﬁt from strategically stating their rols with
the numbers of applicants who were observed to get diﬀerent matches from the
two algorithms. If these numbers are close for the program-proposing algorithm
(and close to zero for the applicant proposing algorithm), then the theory of
simple matches provides a comparably close approximation for the situation in
the complex nrmp market.
The case of programs that have more than one position is not so simple, even
in the case of simple matches. Programs may, at least in theory, possibly proﬁt
both from truncating their rol’s, and from reducing the number of positions
they submit to the match (either by making early arrangements with some
applicants or by withholding positions to be ﬁlled by unmatched applicants after
the match). The temptation for this latter kind of manipulation can be shown
(Tayfun Sonmez 1996a,b) to be larger with the program proposing algorithm
than with the applicant proposing algorithm. Thus, in addition to experiments
10 This would free us from the computationally impossible task of investigating all possible
manipulations by all participants.
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with truncations of rol’s, we must also conduct computational experiments
involving reductions in stated capacities.

B.

Experiments to Determine Upper Bounds for Profitable Strategic Behavior

1. Preliminary Experiments: Truncation of rol’s at the Match Point
As noted above, in a simple market if an applicant is matched to his kth
choice program, or if the lowest ranked applicant a program is matched to is
its kth choice applicant, truncation of the rol at the kth entry would have no
inﬂuence on the match. This is because, in a simple match, the applicant or
program proposing algorithms never have to “backtrack” on an rol. But in
the nrmp backtracking can occur, because of the match variations. So, before
exploring what truncations, if any, could have a strategic eﬀect on the match,
it was ﬁrst necessary to see whether truncations at the match point (i.e. deleting the k + 1 and higher choices for a participant who was matched to his kth
choice) could inﬂuence the result of the match under either algorithm, and how
much. The truncation of applicant rols and program rols were investigated
separately, for each algorithm, for the 1993, 1994, and 1995 matches. In the
majority of cases no change was produced when all rols were truncated at the
match point; and in no case were more than 3 applicants aﬀected by such truncations. (Over the more than 60,000 applicants involved in these experiments,
only 4 were aﬀected by truncations of applicants’ rols; see Section B1 of Appendix B for the detailed results). So truncations at the match point, while
not entirely without eﬀect, do not play a substantial role; they are on the order
of .01 percent of applicants, an order of magnitude smaller than the eﬀects of
changing algorithms.
Because we have now seen that information beyond the match point inﬂuences the outcome for only a tiny percentage of participants, concentrating on
truncations will give us a comparably good approximation for the numbers of
participants who could potentially proﬁt from any kind of strategic manipulation of rols. The computational experiments which follow, therefore, will
concentrate on identifying an upper bound on the number of participants who
(if they had the necessary information) could potentially proﬁt from strategic
behavior involving truncations of their rols above the match point, and (for
programs) reductions in the number of positions they oﬀer in the match below
the number of applicants to which they were matched.
2. Experiments to Determine Upper Bounds
As discussed above, the kinds of strategic manipulation to be considered
involve truncation of rol’s by applicants or programs, and reductions in stated
numbers of positions (quotas) by programs. Since we want to know how often
a single agent can proﬁtably manipulate the stated rol, we could in principle
conduct a separate experiment for each participant, but this would be computationally unfeasible. Consequently we need to design an eﬃcient experiment
that will let us tightly bound the number of individuals who can potentially
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proﬁt from manipulating their rols.
The manipulations involving program quotas raise the question of how to
handle reversions of positions when quotas are to be diﬀerent from those in
the data. Similar questions arise when truncating program rols, as this may
increase unﬁlled positions. All of the experiments concerning strategic behavior
of programs handle reversions by ﬁxing quotas at the ﬁnal quotas observed
after the match with the original match data. None of the results are likely
to be sensitive to this simpliﬁcation, as shown by the results of the sequencing
experiments discussed in Section III and detailed in Appendix A.
For each of the strategic manipulations whose potential magnitude is to be
assessed, the chief diﬃculty in designing the experiments is that a change in
a single rank order list or quota has two kinds of eﬀects: it may potentially
change the match of the applicant or residency program whose rank order list
or quota is changed, but it may also potentially change the match of other
applicants and residency programs. To see why, suppose that the rank order
list of some applicant is truncated above his current match point, and the match
under one of the algorithms is rerun after making (only) this change. Then the
applicant whose rank order list was changed may do better (by being matched
to a more preferred choice) or worse (by being unmatched instead of matched).
At the same time other applicants may do better (and other residency programs
may do worse) because of the availability of the position previously held by the
applicant whose list was truncated.
This means that, if we truncate a group of applicant rol’s, for example,
and see how many of the applicants in this group receive a better match as a
consequence of this change, we will be looking at an overestimate of the number
of applicants in the group who could have beneﬁted from truncating their own
rol–many of them will have instead proﬁted from someone else’s truncation
(even if that person himself became unmatched as a result of his own truncation). So the number obtained in this way would be an upper bound on the
number that would have beneﬁted by truncating their own rol, while holding
all others constant. But we do not have to settle for this upper estimate; we
can reﬁne it iteratively, by now continuing to truncate the rol’s only of those
applicants whose match improved as a result of the previous (collective) truncations. This will allow us to further eliminate from the set of truncations those
who proﬁted from the truncations of applicants who were themselves harmed
by their own truncation. Proceeding in this way, we can continue until no more
reductions in the sample are achieved. This ﬁnal number will still be an upper
bound, of course, since even in a group of truncators who all do better when
they all truncate their preferences, some may be proﬁting from the truncated
rol’s of the others, not from their own truncation.
Experiments were conducted separately for applicants and for programs,
and separately for each of the two algorithms. A computational experiment
for applicants in a given year started by truncating all rol’s just above the
(lowest) match point; i.e. every applicant’s primary rol was truncated just
above the match he received when no rol’s were truncated using the algorithm
in question. (For example, if an applicant originally matched to rank 3 on his
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primary rol, the truncated rol contained only his ﬁrst 2 choices.) Of course,
many applicants were left unmatched by this truncation, while others received
preferred matches (these were the only two possibilities at this stage). Then at
the next step, the rol’s of all those who had truncated their lists but did not
improve were restored to their original length, and the process was repeated with
the smaller number of truncations that remained. This process was repeated
until it converged. Computational experiments for programs were structured
similarly; starting with every program’s rol truncated just above the lowest
ranked match it received. The full results for the nrmp for 1987 and 1993-96
are given in Appendix B. (Table B2 reports the results of the truncation of
applicant rol’s for each algorithm, Table B3 the results for programs.)
The results can be summarized by looking at the ﬁnal upper bounds of the
number of applicants and the number of programs which could possibly beneﬁt
from truncating their Rank Order Lists.
The results are reported and analyzed below, ﬁrst for the nrmp matches,
and then for Thoracic surgery.
a. Results for the nrmp—The truncation experiments with applicants’ rols
yield the following upper bounds for the two algorithms in the years studied.
Table 4: Upper Limit of the Number of Applicants Who Could Beneﬁt by Truncating Their Lists at One Above Their Original Match Point
Upper Limit
Preexisting NRMP Applicant-proposing
Year
algorithm
algorithm
1987
12
0
1993
22
0
1994
13
2
1995
16
2
1996
11
9

As expected, more applicants can beneﬁt from list truncation under the
pre-existing nrmp algorithm than under the applicant proposing algorithm.
Note that the number of applicants who could even potentially beneﬁt from
truncating their rols under the pre-existing nrmp algorithm is in each year
almost exactly equal to the number of applicants who received a preferred match
under the applicant proposing match (line 2 of Table 2). We will return to this
point in a moment, but note that it suggests that this upper bound is very
close to the precise number that would be predicted in the absence of match
variations.
The truncation experiments with programs’ rols yield the following upper
bounds shown in Table 5.
As expected, some programs can beneﬁt from list truncation under either
algorithm. However, consistently more programs beneﬁt from list truncation
under the applicant-proposing algorithm than under the pre-existing nrmp al-
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Table 5: Upper Limit of the Number of Programs That Could Beneﬁt by Truncating
Their Lists at One Above The Original Match Point
Preexisting NRMP Applicant-proposing
Year
algorithm
algorithm
1987
15
27
1993
12
28
1994
15
27
1995
23
36
1996
14
18

gorithm. Note that although the numbers of programs in these upper bounds
remain small, they are in many cases about twice as large as the number of
programs that received a preferred match at the stable matching produced by
the algorithm other than the one being manipulated. (That is, referring back to
Table 2, we see for example that in 1995 only 14 programs preferred the matching produced by the pre-existing nrmp algorithm to the one produced by the
applicant proposing algorithm, but we now ﬁnd 36 programs in our upper bound
of programs that could potentially proﬁt from a manipulation of the applicant
proposing algorithm.) It therefore seemed worthwhile to further examine these
upper bounds, and see if they were overestimates.
For each algorithm, this was ﬁrst done by taking a 50 percent sample of the
programs contained in the upper bound for 1995, and restarting the truncation
experiment with only these programs having truncated rol’s. The idea is that,
if each of these programs can in fact beneﬁt from its own truncation, the experiment would stop after the ﬁrst iteration, with no further reductions in the
upper bound. But if in fact the upper bound is an overestimate, and some of the
programs in it are beneﬁting not from their own truncated rol, but from the
truncation of one of the other rol’s in the upper bound, then on average half
of such “false positives” in our 50 percent sample would have been beneﬁting
from the truncation by one of the programs in the other 50 percent, that are
no longer truncated. In this case we would iterate until the number of truncators who improved their outcome again stabilized at a new, lower upper bound.
This is in fact what happened, so the new estimates for 1995 (equal to twice
the number obtained from the 50 percent sample) look as follows compared to
the old ones.
These results conﬁrm that the numbers that can beneﬁt from the rol truncations stated earlier are indeed overestimates.
A further analysis was undertaken for each of the ﬁve years, to compare the
speciﬁc individual programs and applicants who appear in these upper bounds as
potentially beneﬁting from rol truncations with the programs and applicants
whose results changed when the algorithm changed. This analysis indicated
that those who could beneﬁt from rol truncations were, for the most part,
those who did diﬀerently (generally worse) when the algorithm is changed from
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Table 6: Reﬁned Estimate of the Upper Limit of the Number of Programs That
Could Improve Their Results by Truncating Their Own ROLs in 1995
Preexisting NRMP Applicant-proposing
Estimate
algorithm
algorithm
Original results
23
36
Current estimate
(still an upper limit)
12
22

their side proposing to the other side proposing (without rol truncations).
For example, the applicants who can beneﬁt from rol truncations when the
program proposing algorithm is used are very largely the same as those who
beneﬁt when the algorithm is changed to an applicant proposing algorithm
with no rol truncations. Thus in this respect also, it appears that the theory
for simple markets provides a good approximation of the situation in the nrmp
match.
We next turn to the question of capacity manipulation by programs. Recall
that in an actual match this could be considered by a program in the context
of either an early agreement (for example with an independent applicant) or in
anticipation that some positions would be ﬁlled post-match.
An initial experiment was run setting all program quotas to the number of
positions ﬁlled with the algorithm in question with the original data. (This is
analogous to the initial experiment involving truncations of the rol’s at the
match point, rather than above it.) In a simple match without nrmp match
variations, this would be expected to have no impact on the results. However,
with nrmp match data some diﬀerences were observed, as noted below:
Table 7: Results with Input Quotas Set to Positions Filled, Compared to Original
Results
1993
Result
Programs
Improve
Do Worse
Applicants
Improve
Do Worse

1994

1995

Preexisting
nrmp

Applicantproposing

Preexisting
nrmp

Applicantproposing

Preexisting
nrmp

Applicantproposing

12
none

2
none

9
3

none
2

25
9

none
2

none
12

none
2

3
9

2
none

6
27

2
none

With the applicant proposing algorithm, the diﬀerences are negligible. However, more diﬀerences were observed with the pre-existing nrmp algorithm, and
the results obtained by setting the quotas to the original positions ﬁlled tended
to produce better results for the programs.
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In order to identify programs that could improve their remaining matches
by further reducing their quotas, an iterative technique was employed similar
to that used to investigate the eﬀects of rank order list truncations. After
several iterations revised downward the upper bounds obtained in this way, the
resulting upper bounds on the number of programs that could potentially proﬁt
from stating lower quotas was as follows.

Table 8: Revised Estimate of the Upper Bound of The Number of Programs That
Could Improve Their Remaining Matches by Reducing Quotas
Preexisting NRMP Applicant-proposing
Year
algorithm
algorithm
1987
28
8
1993
16
24
1994
32
16
1995
8
16
1996
44
32

Again, these numbers are still estimates of the upper bound; further reﬁnement would be possible. However, given the size of these numbers, it seems clear
that only a very small number of programs (less than 1 percent) could improve
their remaining matches by reducing their quotas. This does not appear to be
an advisable strategy for programs to follow with either algorithm.
b. Results for Thoracic Surgery—Because the Thoracic surgery match does
not have match variations, the theory tells us precisely which applicants and
programs could improve their match by an optimal manipulation. As a check
on our computational procedures, we conﬁrmed these predictions by running
the same computational experiments on rol truncations as described for the
nrmp matches. The results, summarized below, are as expected.
So, in Thoracic surgery as in the larger and more complex nrmp match,
the opportunities for strategic manipulation are essentially non-existent under
either algorithm. (Colenbrander, 1996, reaches essentially the same conclusions
about the specialty matches he maintains.)

VI.

Why the Diﬀerences are Small: Insights from
the Theory of Simple Markets

All the results to this point can be characterized by noting that the theory
of simple matches, without match variations, gives a good approximation for
the direction of each of the comparisons, and, in addition, the size of all the
changes has been very small. This section explores what insights we can get
from simple markets to help explain why these diﬀerences are so small. The
results in this section are based on computational comparisons similar to those
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discussed earlier, but now concerning hypothetical markets without any match
variations.
The small diﬀerences between algorithms we have been seeing reﬂects that,
in each of the years studied, the set of stable matchings has been small, as
measured by the number of participants who receive diﬀerent matches from the
program-proposing and applicant-proposing algorithms.11 It is therefore of
interest to consider how the set of stable matchings looks for comparably large
markets when we concentrate on simple matches. For this purpose, we consider
the very simple matching markets with n ﬁrms (each with one position) and n
applicants, as n approaches the size of the markets we are studying, namely the
specialty markets like Thoracic surgery, and the general nrmp match.
One factor that strongly inﬂuences the size of the set of stable matchings
(which coincides with the core in this simple model) is the correlation of preferences among programs and among applicants. When preferences are highly
correlated–i.e. when similar programs tend to agree which are the most desirable applicants, and applicants tend to agree which are the most desirable
programs–the set of stable matchings is small. (When preferences are perfectly
correlated then there is a unique stable matching, so both algorithms would produce the same matching.) However as the correlation of preferences goes down,
the size of the set of stable matchings grows, and more and more participants
would be matched diﬀerently by the two algorithms. This is true independently
of the size of the market.
It turns out, however, that the size of the market also plays a critical role, in
an interesting way. Consider the case in which preferences are uncorrelated (so
the set of stable matchings is large). If every applicant could somehow interview
and be interviewed for all of the positions, then the set of stable matchings would
grow larger and larger (even as a percentage of the number of applicants who
could get diﬀerent stable matchings) as the number of applicants and positions
grew. Figure 1 shows that this percentage grows to over 90 percent by the time
n reaches 1,000.
But of course in a real market there is a limit to how many interviews an
applicant can go on, or a program can conduct. And when we take this into
account, we see that the set of stable matchings quickly becomes very small as
the market becomes large.
Speciﬁcally, let k equal the number of interviews a candidate can go on,
and let n equal the number of applicants and positions in the market. Then
even when preferences are completely uncorrelated, as k/n becomes small, the
11 This is the natural measure for the size of the set of stable matchings in the present
context, since the concern is with how many market participants will be aﬀected by a change
in algorithms. Note however that it is diﬀerent from the more common measure of the size
of the set of stable matchings, the number of distinct stable matchings. If 20 applicants
receive diﬀerent assignments at diﬀerent stable matchings, there could be as many as 210 =
1024 diﬀerent stable matchings, in case the 20 applicants can be resolved into 10 independent
pairwise interchanges of positions, or there could be as few as 2 stable matchings, if all 20
applicants are involved in a single irreducible cycle. In either case, if there are 20,000 jobs
being ﬁlled, we have been focusing on the approximately 20 applicants who receive diﬀerent
assignments when we conclude that the set of stable matchings is small.
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Figure 1: Size of the Set of Stable Matchings as a Fraction of n, When k = n
(Uncorrelated Preferences). Note: C(n) is the number of applicants
who get diﬀerent stable matches when the market size is n.

set of stable matchings becomes small. So for example, if k = 15 (not an
unreasonable approximation for the nrmp) and n > 10, 000, fewer than 0.1
percent of applicants would receive a diﬀerent match from the two algorithms.12
That is, even with completely uncorrelated preferences, we see in this simple
market the same one-in-a-thousand order of magnitude that we see in the nrmp.
And for simple markets the size of the specialty matches like Thoracic surgery,
with n on the order of 100 positions, if we suppose that applicants interview
at no more than k = 10 programs we ﬁnd only about 2 percent of applicants
receiving diﬀerent matches from the two algorithms. Figure 2 graphs the curves
for ﬁxed k , as n goes from 10 to 10,000.
Especially in view of the fact that preferences are not uncorrelated in the
medical matches, this means that the orders of magnitude of the eﬀects studied
in the actual matches are very comparable to what we should expect of simple
matches with similar k and n. Thus (once we look at both k and n) these simple
markets turn out to provide a good approximation not only for the direction of
the eﬀects we are seeing, but also for their size.
The reason this is important for the present study of the nrmp and specialty
matches is that, in the theoretical study of simple markets, we can look at what
would happen when we know agents’ true preferences, not just the rols which
they submit to the match; whereas in the study of real matches we have been
using as data the submitted rols. So one theoretical possibility might have
been that the reason we ﬁnd such small potential for strategic manipulation
is that our data has been collected after such manipulation has already taken
12 And the variance (based on 1,000 randomly generated simple markets) is well under .001
percent.
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Figure 2: Size of the Set of Stable Matchings as a Fraction of n for Diﬀerent Values
of k (Uncorrelated Preferences). Note: C(n) is the number of applicants
who get diﬀerent stable matches when the market size is n; k is number
of programs on an applicant’s ROL.

place. That is, one counter-hypothesis might explain our results by positing
that, perhaps there are substantial opportunities for strategic manipulation, but
these have been exhausted by the time we look at the rols submitted to the
match, because the participants have already behaved strategically in an optimal
way. Another counter-hypothesis could be that the hybrid nature of the preexisting nrmp algorithm in fact produces matches that are far from the worst
possible stable matching for applicants, and that the set of stable matchings
is therefore substantially larger than we detect. The results discussed in this
section show that these hypotheses are implausible, because when we looked
at similarly sized artiﬁcial matches, in which we can examine the hypothetical
participants’ true preferences, we ﬁnd that the set of stable matchings is close
to the size we have computed from the rol data. Thus the study of simple
markets provides an explanation of not only the direction of the eﬀects we have
been examining, but also their small size.13
13 It remains an open problem to develop analytical results which explain why the core of this
simple market shrinks as the market grows when the number of interviews an applicant can
go on remains constant. The fact that every worker who does get a diﬀerent job at diﬀerent
stable matchings is involved in certain sorts of preference cycles may provide an avenue for
obtaining such results.
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Theory and Computation in Economic Design: Some Methodological Reﬂections

Perhaps the ﬁrst rule of any design eﬀort is that “details matter.” The details
determine what outcomes are even feasible, and so they matter in the most basic
aspects of design, and they have implications for all of the market’s properties,
so they matter for the subtlest aspects of the design’s consequences. So every
design eﬀort will be diﬀerent. But if we are to develop a body of knowledge
about design practice in economics, we need to think about the methodological
issues that may be common to many design eﬀorts. This section is an attempt
to put the methodological issues encountered in the nrmp design and evaluation into a context that may be useful for other design eﬀorts. Speciﬁcally, this
design eﬀort involved the continual interplay among various aspects of simple
theory, computational experiments, and theoretical computation. The simple
theory guided the design of computational experiments on the complex system,
which provided unpredicted results that were then explained by theoretical computation.
The reason there are gaps between theory and design is that, just as design
is detailed, theoretical models must often be sparse, to be useful for organizing
and directing work in a variety of applications whose connections may become
apparent only with the beneﬁt of theory. Much of this paper has therefore been
concerned with ﬁlling the gaps between simple abstract markets and complex
real ones. But before we discuss the ﬁlling of gaps, it is useful to recall the essential role played by the theory of simple matching markets. This role ranged
from suggesting the basic design of the clearinghouse algorithm and the comparisons of the algorithms, to directing attention to aspects of the market in
which problems might be anticipated, and to oﬀering insights into how these
might be overcome.
It was the existing simple theory, and the empirical studies it permitted to
be conducted on ﬁeld data, that pointed to the importance of stable matchings.
And, although counterexamples showed that stable matchings might not exist
in the complex American medical market (Roth, 1984), the theory of simple
markets suggested a general architecture for an algorithm to ﬁnd stable matchings. Furthermore, it showed that algorithms in which proposals were issued
by applicants could be expected to produce stable matchings as favorable as
possible to applicants. In short, the body of theory which existed prior to the
start of this design, e.g. as summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), already
constituted a rough road map for the mechanism design and evaluation reported
here.
At the same time, the existing body of theory, through counterexamples designed to explore its limits (inspired by empirical studies of existing markets),
pointed to questions that needed to be answered. These included the role of
sequencing in design of the algorithm, the frequency with which the algorithm
might fail to ﬁnd a stable matching, and the frequency with which opportunities
for strategic manipulation might arise. These all required estimations of mag-
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nitudes, which in turn required computational experiments on the data. Some
of these computational experiments were straightforward to conduct. But for
estimating how often strategic opportunities might arise, the theory played an
essential role in the design of the computational experiments.
Speciﬁcally, although the main conclusions about strategic behavior do not
carry over from the simple to the complex market, the theory of the simple case
gives us not only ﬁnal conclusions, but also insight into the way that strategic
behavior works. In the case of misrepresentation of rols, the way an applicant
might gain an advantage, in either the simple or complex markets, is to state
an rol that causes him, at some point in the algorithm, to make a rejection
that would not have been made if he had submitted his true preferences.14 This
rejection causes a residency program to have a vacancy and hence make an oﬀer
to another applicant, who in turn may make a diﬀerent rejection than he would
have if the original applicant had stated his true preferences. It is the propagation of this “vacancy chain” through the market that raises the possibility that
an applicant could do better than to state his true preferences. The fact that the
potential advantage comes from what rejections are made implies in the simple
model that the possibility of proﬁtable strategic misrepresentations of rols can
be investigated by looking at only the small subset of misrepresentations that
consist of truncations. To see if this was approximately true for the complex
market required a computational experiment, and (when this proved to be the
case) it became computationally feasible to investigate the strategic properties
of the complex market, through an experiment concentrating on truncations.
So the theory allowed us to see what computational experiments would give us
the answer to a question that the theory alone could not answer.
While computational experiments on the data allow us to get answers that
may not be available from simple theory, they do not necessarily let us understand why the answers are what they are. In addition, results obtained from
exploring a large and complex data set with a large and new piece of software
(the new algorithm) need to be checked in some way, to make sure that the
results are not due to some unanticipated artifact of the way the algorithm
deals with the complexities of the data.15 That is, although properly constructed computational experiments on the data oﬀer us answers to questions
we cannot answer with theory alone, we need both to check and to understand
these answers before we can have the conﬁdence in them that we would like to
have before recommending that the new algorithm be considered for use in the
market.
We addressed these issues in two ways, by computational experiments on
14 The propagation of vacancy chains as such in simple markets is a topic that was explored
in the course of this design eﬀort, and is reported in Blum Roth and Rothblum (1997).
15 Of course it was necessary to check directly that the program worked, and in fact it was
easy to conﬁrm that the matchings it produced were stable as well as feasible with regard to
all the match variations. So the question we are referring to here is not whether the program
does what it was designed to do, but rather whether the apparent small size of the set of
stable matchings might have to do with some aspect of how it handles the match variations.
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the data from the Thoracic Surgery matches, and by theoretical computation
to determine how the size of the set of stable matches behaved in large simple
markets. The ﬁrst of these allowed us to exercise the software on a medical
market free of the match variations present in the general medical market. The
theory therefore permitted us to interpret the comparisons between the two
algorithms as unambiguously measuring the size of the set of stable matchings.
The small size of this set therefore had no possibility of resulting from some
aspect of how the algorithm deals with match variations.
The computations on thousands of randomly generated simple markets with
ﬁxed length of rols and varying numbers of participants allowed us to see how
the size of the set of stable matchings shrinks as the market grows, which establishes a new kind of core convergence result. This shows that the match
variations in the medical market do not substantially contribute to the size of
the set of stable matchings, since the results on the market data are entirely
consistent with the results for similarly sized simple markets. Given the theoretical results on strategic misrepresentation, this core convergence result also
shows that it is always a best reply for all but a tiny percentage of participants
in large simple markets to state their true preferences.
Note that we distinguish between what we call the “computational experiments” on the actual nrmp data and the “theoretical computation” on the randomly generated simple markets. This has to do with our view that “theory”
resides in the simplicity of the model and systematic nature of the conclusions,
rather than the body of mathematical technique traditionally associated with
theory. The theoretical computations tell us how the diﬀerence between the
applicant and ﬁrm optimal stable matches varies with the size of a simple market. This new, computational result, combined with existing theory, allows us
to interpret this as precisely measuring the size of the core of the market, and
to determine the implications this has for the possibility of proﬁtable strategic
manipulation. The theorems explaining why the core must converge as it does
will surely follow (see Feldin (1998) for some progress in this direction).
In summary, the design process discussed here involved interplay among
various aspects of simple theory, computational experiments, and theoretical
computation.16 We suspect that, as we build a body of engineering practice
in economics, this will prove to be a general pattern.

VIII.

Concluding Remarks

The crisis of conﬁdence that threatened to undermine participation in the nrmp
was serious precisely because the kind of market failure which the nrmp was
initially developed to correct arose when residency programs and applicants lost
conﬁdence in the existing market. But by the time of this modern crisis, the
historical market failure and how it was corrected by the nrmp were understood.
16 Laboratory

experiments also have a role to play, although not one we will discuss here;
but see Kagel and Roth (1999).
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So was the fact that similar market failures in British medical markets had
occurred and been corrected with stable matching mechanisms, while unstable
mechanisms had failed (Roth 1990, 91). In addition, the general class of market
failures due to unraveling of appointment dates had been identiﬁed in many
markets (Roth and Xing 1994). So, although physicians who had participated in
the unraveling of the American medical market and in the formation of the nrmp
were no longer active, it was not diﬃcult to communicate to the participants in
the modern market why it was desirable to focus on changes in the market which
would not re-ignite the unraveling of appointment dates (Roth 1996b).17 Thus,
although what we knew about two sided matching markets did not provide an
immediate solution to the design of a new market for physicians, it provided
clear guidelines and suggested clear approaches.
It was nevertheless troubling to us at the outset of this design eﬀort that
not only did none of the standard theorems about simple matching markets
apply directly to the medical market, but counterexamples to the conclusions
of many of them were known when the complications of the actual market are
present. These counterexamples had the potential to be of great importance, as
in the possibility (which does not arise in simple markets) that diﬀerent stable
matchings might yield diﬀerent levels of employment. And, indeed, our results
show that in this market this possibility is real, and so cannot be ruled out
with better theory. But (see Table 2), of the more than 100,000 applicants
in the years we studied in detail, only two applicants (one in 1987 and one in
1996) would have changed from employed to unemployed or vice versa at the
diﬀerent stable matchings we consider. Because this diﬀerence was both tiny
and unsystematic, it did not play a role in the market design.
This, and the related results about the small number of applicants who receive diﬀerent matches at the diﬀerent stable matchings, point to a need to
develop theory in ways which will tell us not only about the possibility of different eﬀects, but also about their probability and likely magnitudes. It seems
to us that questions about magnitudes of the sort we encountered in the course
of this design will often arise in eﬀorts to employ economic theory in the design
of institutions for complex markets. Theoretical computation can be a big help
in this eﬀort, as it was in the present case in clarifying the unexpected consequences of the simple fact that applicants can interview at only a small fraction
of the available positions.
17 Indeed the initial study proposal (Roth 1995) quoted Hippocrates’ famous dictum that
when preparing to treat a disease

“The physician must be able to tell the antecedents, know the present, and
foretell the future- must mediate these things, and have two special objects in
view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm.”
In this connection it is worth mentioning that, particularly because conﬁdence in the market
was the key issue, the study was conducted in an unusually public way, with progress reports
posted regularly on the internet (see http://www.economics.harvard.edu/˜aroth/nrmp.html)
and widely distributed to interested organizations of physicians and medical students. A ﬁnal
report, brieﬂy summarizing the overall results as in Tables 1 and 2 was presented to the
medical community at large in Roth and Peranson (1997).
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More generally, just as there is a chemical engineering literature (and not
just literature about theoretical and laboratory chemistry), and a medical literature (and not just a biology literature), economists need to develop a scientiﬁc
literature concerned with practical problems of design. An engineering-oriented
design literature, and the theory that supports it, will be diﬀerent from the basic
science on which it depends, both in emphasis and in method. And if we do not
develop such a literature, the practical problems of design will be relegated to
the arena of “just consulting,” and we will fail to beneﬁt from the accumulation
of knowledge which is so evident in other kinds of engineering.

Appendix A: Results of the Computational
Experiments Concerned with
Sequencing
Table A1 presents results from the sequencing experiments on the preexisting
NRMP algorithm. Table A2 summarizes results of the experiments related
to sequencing in the applicant-proposing algorithm. Table A3 compares the
results when input quotas are set to ﬁnal quotas and reversion processing is
eliminated to the initial results.
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Table A1 — Eﬀects of Sequence in Which Programs Are Processed
A. Results with Programs Processed in Descending
Code Order Compared to Original Results with Preexisting nrmp Algorithm
Result
1993 1994
1995
Programs
Improve
none
2
2
Do Worse
2
2
none
Applicants
Improve
2
2
none
Do Worse none
2
2
B. Sequencing of Reversions: Results with Input Quotas Set to Final Quotas and Reversion Processing
Eliminated, Compared to Original Results with Preexisting nrmp Algorithm
Result
1993 1994
1995a
Programs
Improve
2
2
none
Do Worse none
2
2
Applicants
Improve
none
2
2
Do Worse
2
none
none
Notes: In 1994, when some programs and applicants did better while others did worse,
there was no correlation between the change in result and the code numbers of the
applicants and programs.
a
Subsquently, the years 1987 and 1996 were also examined with similar results: no
applicants were aﬀected in 1987, two were aﬀected in 1996.
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Table A2 — Summary of Results of Experiments Related to Sequencing in the
Applicant-Proposing Algorithm
Sequence of processing

1993

1994

1995

A. Baseline Results (when Program Selected from Stack, Applicants Processed in Ascending Program Rank
Number Sequence)
Applicants ascending; singles and couples intermixed
Match resulta
Loops detected

—
3

—
6

—
4

B. Applicant and Couples Processing Sequence (when Program Selected from Stack, Applicants Processed
in Ascending Program Rank Number Sequence)
Applicants ascending; couples last
Match result
Loops detected

same
0

same
0

same
0

Applicants ascending; couples last
Match result
Loops detected

same
2

same
0

same
0

Applicants descending; couples ﬁrst
Match results
Loops detected

2 applicants worse
3

2 applicants worse
6

same
1

Applicants ascending; couples ﬁrst
Match result
Loops detected

2 applicants worse
1

2 applicants worse
59

same
3

C. Sequence of Processing Applicants Ranked by Program Selected from Program Stack (When Program
Selected from Stack, Applicants Processed in Descending Program Rank Number Sequence)
Applicants ascending; singles and couples intermixed
Match result

same

Loops detected

same

17

9 applicants improved,
3 applicants worseb
148

same

2

9 applicants improved,
3 applicants worseb
2

Applicants ascending; couples last
Match result
Loops detected
a

This is the base result to which others are compared.
In part C, the results for the two experiments for 1994 (couples intermixed and couples last)
were the same. In both cases, the diﬀerences in the results in part C as compared to the
baseline results in part A were caused by chains resulting from two applicants doing worse in
part C when compared with part A.
b

Table A3 — Results with Input Quotas Set to Final Quotas and Reversion
Processing Eliminated, Compared to Initial Results with Applicant Proposing
Algorithm
Result
Programs
Improve
Do worse
Applicants
Improve
Do worse
a

1993

1994

1995a

none
none

none
2

none
2

none
none

2
none

2
none

Subsequently, 1987 and 1996 were also examined, with no applicants aﬀected in 1987
and a single chain of nine aﬀected in 1996.

62

0
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Appendix B: Results of the Computational Experiments Concerned with Truncation of ROLs and Capacity Reductions
The results of truncation at the match point are reported in Table B1. Table
B2 shows the results for iterative truncations of Applicant rols, while Table B3
shows the corresponding results for iterative truncations of program rols.
Table B1 — Truncations at the Match Point
1993

1994

1995

Diﬀerence in Result for Both the Preexisting nrmp Algorithm and the Applicant-Proposing Algorithm When Applicant rols are Truncated at the Match Point:
none

2 applicants improve, same positions ﬁlled

2 applicants improve, same positions ﬁlled

Diﬀerence in Result for the Preexisting nrmp Algorithm When Program rols are Truncated at
the Match Point:
none

none

2 applicants do worse, same positions ﬁlled

Diﬀerence in Result for the Applicant-Processing Algorithm When Program rols are Truncated
at the Match Point:
none

3 applicants do worse, same number of positions
ﬁlled, but not same positions (3 programs ﬁlled 1
less position; 1 program ﬁlled 1 more position; 1
program ﬁlled 2 more positions; 1 additional position was reverted from one program to another)

none

1993
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
17,209
4,546
17,209
4,536
4,546
2,093
4,536
2,082
2,093
1,036
2,082
1,032
1,036
514
1,023
498
514
258
498
241
258
135
241
116
135
73
116
52
73
48
52
25
48
34
25
12
34
27
12
5
27
24
5
2
24
22
2
0
22
22
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1994
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
17,725
4,935
17,725
4,934
4,935
2,361
4,934
2,359
2,361
1,185
2,359
1,183
1,185
602
1,183
598
602
292
598
287
292
151
287
143
151
75
143
66
75
40
66
31
40
27
31
17
27
18
17
7
18
14
7
3
14
13
3
2
13
13
2
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1995
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorighm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
18,170
5,763
18,170
5,758
5,763
2,907
5,758
2,899
2,907
1,572
2,899
1,559
1,572
857
1,559
844
857
473
844
460
473
251
460
238
251
136
238
124
136
79
124
67
79
45
67
31
45
31
31
17
31
22
17
8
22
18
8
4
18
16
4
2
16
16
2
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1996
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
propsing
T
T&1
T
T&1
18,316
5,805
18,316
5,806
5,805
2,915
5,806
2,917
2,915
1,569
2,917
1,571
1,569
861
1,571
864
861
481
864
482
481
271
482
271
271
157
271
155
157
89
155
87
89
57
87
55
57
36
55
33
36
24
33
21
24
19
21
15
19
15
15
13
15
14
13
12
14
13
12
11
13
12
11
10
12
11
10
9
11
11
9
9

Notes: Columns labeled “T” report the number of matches involving truncated rols. Columns labeled “T & 1” report the number of matches involving truncated
rols and “improved” matches.

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

1987
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&I
T
T&1
16,117
4,324
16,116
4,317
4,324
1,894
4,317
1,887
1,894
898
1,887
891
898
437
891
429
437
203
429
194
203
93
194
84
93
41
84
31
41
24
31
13
24
18
13
6
18
14
6
2
14
12
2
0
12
12
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Table B2 — Results for Iterative Truncations of Applicant ROLs
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1993
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
3,342
1,457
3,342
1,462
1,457
740
1,462
748
740
382
748
394
382
201
394
216
201
107
216
122
107
64
122
79
64
37
79
52
37
22
52
37
22
15
37
30
15
13
30
28
13
12
28
28
12
12
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1994
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
3,369
1,514
3,369
1,517
1,514
809
1,517
813
809
441
813
444
441
249
444
255
229
138
255
145
138
79
145
86
79
44
86
52
44
31
52
39
31
23
39
32
23
20
32
30
20
18
30
29
18
16
29
28
16
15
28
27
15
15
27
27
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1995
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
3,444
1,538
3,444
1,541
1,538
783
1,541
790
783
420
790
431
420
237
431
248
237
130
248
141
130
77
141
89
77
50
89
62
50
35
62
47
35
29
47
41
29
26
41
38
26
24
38
36
24
23
36
36
23
23
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

1996
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&1
T
T&1
3,410
1,445
3,410
1,444
1,445
727
1,444
725
727
384
725
384
384
213
384
212
213
114
212
115
114
71
115
72
71
50
72
52
50
35
52
39
35
26
39
30
26
21
30
25
21
19
25
23
19
18
23
22
18
17
22
21
17
16
21
20
16
15
20
19
15
14
19
18
14
14
18
18

Notes: Columns labeled “T” report the number of matches involving truncated rols. Columns labeled “T & 1” report the number of matches involving truncated
rols and “improved” matches.

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

1987
Original
NRMP
Applicantalgorithm
proposing
T
T&I
T
T&1
2,967
1,345
2,967
1,349
1,345
670
1,349
675
670
347
675
353
347
186
353
194
186
100
194
110
100
55
110
66
55
33
66
44
33
21
44
33
21
17
33
29
17
15
29
27
15
15
27
27
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Table B3 — Results for Iterative Truncations of Program ROLs

Roth and Peranson
Appendix B
41

Roth and Peranson

Appendix C

42

Appendix C: Formal Deﬁnitions of Stability
Simple matching markets
For markets without linkages between positions we use the “college admissions”
model as reformulated in Roth (1985) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Chapter 5). There are two ﬁnite and disjoint sets, F = {f1 , ..., fn } and W =
{w1 , ..., wm }, of ﬁrms and workers. For each ﬁrm f in F, there is a positive
integer qf , which indicates the number of (identical) positions f has to oﬀer.
An outcome is a matching of workers to ﬁrms, such that each worker is
matched to at most one ﬁrm, and each ﬁrm is matched to at most its quota
of workers. It will be convenient to denote a ﬁrm that has some number of
unﬁlled positions as matched to itself in each of those positions, and similarly
an unmatched worker will be matched to herself. To give a formal deﬁnition,
deﬁne for any set X an unordered family of elements of X to be a collection of
elements, not necessarily distinct, in which the order is immaterial.
A matching µ is a function from the set F ∪ W into the set of unordered
families of elements of F ∪ W such that:
(i) |µ(w)| = 1 for every worker w and µ(w) = w if µ(w) ∈
/ F;
(ii) |µ(f )| = qf for every ﬁrm f , and if the number of workers in µ(f ), say r,
is less than qf , then µ(f ) contains qf − r copies of f ;
(iii) µ(w) = f if and only if w is in µ(f ).
Each worker has preferences over the ﬁrms (and the possibility of remaining
unmatched in the market), and each ﬁrm has preferences over the workers (and
the possibility of leaving a position unﬁlled). All preferences are transitive, and
strict (recall that in the markets we consider participants are obliged to submit
rank orders which are necessarily strict). We will write fi >w fj to indicate that
worker w prefers fi to fj . Similarly, wi >f wj represents ﬁrm f ’s preferences
P (f ) over individual workers. Firm f is acceptable to worker w if f >w w, and
worker w is acceptable to ﬁrm f if w >f f , i.e., an acceptable ﬁrm is one which
is preferable to being unmatched, and an acceptable worker is one which the
ﬁrm prefers to leaving a position unﬁlled.
Each worker’s preferences over alternative matchings correspond exactly to
her preferences over her own assignments at the two matchings. Things are
not quite so simple for ﬁrms, because even though we have described ﬁrms’
preferences over workers, each ﬁrm with a quota greater than 1 must be able to
compare groups of workers in order to compare alternative matchings. It will be
suﬃcient for our purposes to assume merely that a ﬁrm’s preferences over groups
of employees it could be matched with (i.e., over groups of not more than qf
workers) are such that, for any two assignments that diﬀer in only one worker, it
prefers the assignment containing the more preferred worker (and is indiﬀerent
between them if it is indiﬀerent between the workers). Any preferences of this
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sort are called responsive to the ﬁrm’s preferences over individual workers (Roth,
1985).
A matching µ is individually irrational if µ(w) = f for some worker w and
ﬁrm f such that either the worker is unacceptable to the ﬁrm or the ﬁrm is
unacceptable to the worker. Such a matching will also be said to be blocked
by the unhappy agent. A ﬁrm f and worker w will be said together to block a
matching µ if they are not matched to one another at µ, but would both prefer
to be matched to one another than to (one of) their present assignments. That
is, µ is blocked by the ﬁrm-worker pair (f, w) if µ(w) = f and if f >w µ(w)
and w >f σ for some σ in µ(f ). (Note that σ may equal either some worker
w in µ(f ), or, if one of ﬁrm f ’s positions is unﬁlled at µ(f ), σ may equal
f ). Matchings blocked in this way by an individual or by a pair of agents
are unstable in the sense that there are agents with both the incentive (because
preferences are responsive) and the power (under rules which allow any ﬁrm and
worker to conclude an agreement with each other) to disrupt such matchings.
So we can now deﬁne a matching µ to be stable if it is not blocked by any
individual or any ﬁrm-worker pair.18

Complex matches
In the medical markets served by the nrmp, the employers are residency programs and the workers are physicians applying to those programs. The simple
model of the previous section does not allow for the variety of matching requirements observed in the medical market, for which purpose we will have to
distinguish between diﬀerent kinds of applicants, and diﬀerent kinds of residency
programs.
Let the set of applicants be A = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ C, where A1 is the set of (single)
applicants who seek no more than one position, A2 is the set of applicants
who may want two jobs, and who submit supplemental lists of ﬁrst year jobs
in connection with any second year position on their rol which requires a
complementary ﬁrst year position (and does not come with one automatically),
and C is the set of couples, who submit a single rol listing pairs of positions. A
member of C is a couple {ai , aj } such that ai is in the set A3 (of husbands) and
aj is in the set A4 , and the sets A1 , A2 , A3 , and A4 are sets of applicants, who
together make up the entire population of individual applicants, which will be
denoted A = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4 . (The Ai may not be disjoint, since members
of a couple may also submit supplemental lists.) The reason for denoting the set
of applicants both as A and as A is that from the point of view of a potential
employer, the members of a couple C = {ai , aj } are two distinct applicants who
seek distinct positions (typically in diﬀerent residency programs), while from
the point of view of the couple they are one agent with preferences over pairs
of positions.
18 This deﬁnition of stability appears to account only for coalitions of size one or two, but
in fact accounts for coalitions of any size (i.e., stable matchings are in the core; see Roth and
Sotomayor, [1990]).
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The set of residency programs is R = {r1 , ..., rn } and associated with each
program r is a positive integer qr indicating how many positions it seeks to ﬁll.
However, for some programs r, qr may not be a constant at every point in the
matching process. There are two reasons why qr may change. A residency
program r may have an agreement with another residency program r (typically
within the same hospital) that if r can only ﬁll k < qr positions, the remaining
qr − k positions will be added to the capacity of r . In such a situation, the
algorithm will change qr to k and qr to qr +(qr −k). (It can also happen that the
qi −k unﬁlled positions revert to more than one other residency program, and so
the total number of positions need not remain constant, and diﬀerent positions
from a given program may revert to diﬀerent programs.) The other reason why
quotas may vary is that some residency programs wish to have an even number
of residents, so a residency program r with quota q may have its quota reduced
to q  = q − 2 in the event that it can only be matched to a maximum of q − 1
residents. (These quota adjustments take place after an initial attempt to make
a stable match, and cause the matching algorithm to continue from the current
match; in what follows, discussion of stability will refer to the current quota of
a program r at any point in the algorithm, except as indicated.)
Applicants in the set A1 submit rol’s over residency programs, and hence
have preferences just like the workers in the simple model discussed earlier. Applicants in the set A2 have on their rol’s at least one second year program which
requires (but does not supply) ﬁrst year training as well, and these applicants
submit a supplemental rol for each such position, indicating their preferences
for ﬁrst year positions, conditional on being matched to a given second year position. Each couple c = {ai , aj } in the set C submits, as a single rol, a ranked
list of ordered pairs of positions, i.e. an ordered list of elements of R × R whose
ﬁrst element is some (ri , rj ) which is the couples’ ﬁrst choice pair of positions for
ai and aj respectively, and so forth. Each residency program submits as their
rol an ordered list of members of A , i.e. of individual applicants (whether or
not they are members of a couple).
Having thus deﬁned the form in which diﬀerent kinds of agents state their
preferences, we can now deﬁne stable matchings. A matching µ with range
R ∪ A is deﬁned as in the simple market, except that for an applicant a in
the set A2 it may be that |µ(a)| = 1 or 2 if µ(a) matches a to a program for
which it has submitted a supplemental rol. In case |µ(a)| = 2 we will write
µ(a) = (r1 , r2 ), where r1 is the (second year) residency program on a’s primary
rol, and r2 is the (ﬁrst year) residency program on a’s supplemental rol when
a is matched with r1 . (When |µ(a)| = 1 it must be that r = µ(a) is on a’s
primary rol.)
As in the case of the simple market considered earlier, we will say a matching
is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or by a pair of agents
consisting of an individual and a residency program, or by a couple together
with one or two residency programs.
A matching µ is blocked by an individual applicant (in the set A1 or A2 ), or
by a residency program, if µ matches that agent to some individual or residency
program not on its rol, precisely as in the simple model. A matching is blocked
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by an individual couple {ai , aj } if they are matched to a pair (ri , rj ) not on their
rol. Of course no individual or couple blocks a matching at which he or it is
unmatched.
A residency program r and an applicant a in the set A1 together block a
matching µ precisely as in the simple market, if they are not matched to one
another and would both prefer to be. A residency program r and an applicant
a in the set A2 together block a matching µ if r prefers a to one of its matches
under µ (i.e. aj >r σ for some σ in µ(r)), and if either r >a r1 ∈ µ(a) where
the preferences >a correspond to a’s primary rol, or r >a r2 ∈ µ(a) and >a
corresponds to a’s supplemental rol for the position r1 ∈ µ(a).
A couple c = {a1 , a2 } and residency programs r and r block a matching µ
if (r, r ) >c µ(c) and if either
/ µ(r), a1 >r σ for some σ ∈ µ(r) and either a2 ∈ µ(r ) or
(i)
a1 ∈

a2 >r σ for some σ ∈ µ(r ) or
/ µ(r ), a2 >r σ  for some σ  ∈ µ(r ) and either a1 ∈ µ(r ) or
(ii)
a2 ∈
a1 >r σ for some σ ∈ µ(r).
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